I could present many questions and scenarios here which I believe would, at least suggest, that our present system is operating on the fringe of outright and flagrant disregard for constitutional intent. However, for the purposes of this paper my presentation will encompass the Internal Revenue Service and related directives/ laws/regulations. The Sixteenth Amendment has been challenged in court from every direction possible and some not so possible. From prominent lawyers to so-called patriots, the Sixteenth Amendment lives on in our current liberal court system as the ONLY justification for the personal income (compensation tax. Some have often attempted to rely on arguing the legitimacy of its ratification or simply stating that the 16th Amendment is unconstitutional. Most of these arguments are either wholly without foundation or simply were presented in a poor light by untrained self-representing litigants.
During my research into this subject I believe I've found a new angle of attack; find out what Congress actually intended by their implementation of the Sixteenth Amendment; any first year law student will tell you intent is 9/10ths of the law. Sounds simple enough- let's get started with some basic background/foundation:
Before a serious discussion of income tax can transpire, we must first go to the source of the controling law; the Constitution of the United States. While there are many variations of interpretations and overall context, a broad view of the 14th through the 17th paints a very vivid, molded intent; a desire to "soften" republicanism by minimizing state power/sovereignty; moving us away from federalism, replacing it with nationalism.
First, constitutionalized subjects were noticed (created) w/ 14th Amendment; 15th Amendment ensured the heavy hand of nationalized power; funding was procured w/16th Amendment; then finally, power (sovereignty) was removed from the states with the 17th Amendment.
The division of powers we use to be so proud of has become archaic as these Amendments continue working heavily in regrouping the power of the Crown under a nationalized system of socialized democracy.
While this macro intent is beyond the scope of this writing, keep in mind that for purposes of this writing our Constitution gave birth to the U.S. civil government created in trust of, by and for the people; a government of limited power --thus, non-sovereign-- which was intended to be subservient to the mandates of that great document and to succumb to the will of the several states by way of state representation through the Senate. This subservience can be recognized if we use a bit of logic and create a chain-of-command. First ...;
1. God (created Mankind)
2. Mankind (created the Constitution)
3. Constitution (created Federal Government)
4. Federal Government (created Public servant)
5. Public Servant (created Serfs), and ...
[6. Serfs (what we are evolving into soon to answer to a centralized power)]
The above is a general view of our intended understood chain of command. We can also work in to it the more detailed degrees which would include the state constitutions. But suffice it to say the "creator" is/must logically always be greater than the created; so what came first: the states or the federal government? And since all power was first invested in the People, any other subsequent authority is subservient and inferior to its creator.
Now let's get to the specifics of taxation:
The Constitution has authorized only two classifications for taxes: 1) Direct, and 2) Indirect.
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Title 26, USC, mixes direct and indirect taxes without this distinction or its related certainty in use and does so (allegedly) under the authority of the 16th Amendment. However, the constitutional authority to tax is still premised on the classification and operation of such tax so imposed, i.e. whether it is a direct or indirect tax. Where the natural person fits into this scheme of taxation is critical, as private persons can have taxable income with the presence of certain criteria. The issue comes down to the nature of the tax, whether it is direct or indirect, and whether or not the income is, in fact, taxable.
"Representative and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, ..."
Article I, Section 2, clause 3
"No capitation, or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken."
Article I, Section 9, clause 4
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
Article I, Section 8, clause 1
The above limited constitutional authorities are the only sources of authority the Congress has to create revenue laws. The draftees of the Constitution were not satisfied by these limitations because they knew and understood first hand that the power to tax was the power to control and destroy, as they had just fought a war premised on unjust taxation. Therefore, to control the method of passing revenue laws they further restricted the method to tax:
"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills."
Article I, Section 7, clause 1
On July 2, 1909, the Congress proposed an Amendment to the above constitutional authority, which by February 3, 1913 was (allegedly) ratified by three-fourths (3/4) of the states pursuant to Article V. of the Constitution. On February 25, 1913 the Secretary of State, Philander Chase Know, certified the ratification of that Amendment pursuant to the Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 80, Sec. 2, Rev. Stat., Section 205 (2nd. ed. 1878) current version, as amended at 1 USC, Section 1066 (Supp. 11 1984) as the 16th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
"The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states and without regard to any census or enumeration."
16th Amendment, U.S. Constitution
With forgoing authorities being representative of the two taxing categories previously noted: 1) direct, and 2) indirect, let's further qualify these categories. In Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 9-13 federal taxes, their types, and application have long since been decided and it is therefore axiomatic that:
"The distinction between direct and indirect taxation was well understood by the framers of the Constitution and those who adopted it."
Pollock v. Farmer's Loan, 157 U.S. 429, 573-574
Our courts have held many times that the name of a tax is of no real importance. What is important is the "operation" of the tax. It's operation will determine its classification. If a tax is merely called an indirect tax, when it essentially operates as a direct tax, it is nevertheless a direct tax. The operation of direct and indirect taxation envisions to whom, to what, and how the tax is applied and the mode in which it is collected. Therefore, direct and indirect taxes are directed to segregatable classifications of taxable events regarding individuals and persons.
"In order to determine whether a tax is to be direct or indirect within the meaning of the Constitution it must be ascertained whether the one upon whom, by law, the burden of paying it is first cast, can therefore shift it to another person. If he cannot, the tax would then be direct, and hence, however obvious in other respects it might be a duty, impost or excise, it cannot be levied by rule of uniformity and must be apportioned."
Pollack v. Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429
An indirect tax is defined as:
"A tax upon some right or privilege or corporate franchise; e.g. privilege tax; franchise tax. A tax laid upon the happening of an event as distinguished from its tangible fruits."
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition
"... (I)ndirect taxes are levied upon commodities before they reach the consumer, and are paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall, not as taxes but as part of the market price of the commodity."
Cooley, Taxation 10, 61
A direct tax is defined as:
"One that is imposed directly upon property, according to its value. It is generally spoken of as a property tax ... ."
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition
"Direct taxes include those assessed upon property, person, business, income, etc., of those who pay them; ... ."
Cooley, Taxation 10, 61
"Taxes on personal property or on the income of personal property are likewise direct taxes."
There must be certain basic principles of law that must be applied to taxes or the result would be that the legislature could pass a tax that was unconstitutional by simply calling it what they want (direct or indirect; excise, impost or duty) and apply any method of collection that suits their fancy. In this light certain differences must be made known plainly distinguishing between the two types of taxes. With this clear distinction, we are able to categorize the taxes we pay:
The mandate regarding a direct tax is clear. In granting this tax authority the draftees of the Constitution emphasized the positive clause, Article I, Section 2, clause 3, and then followed with the negative clause, Article I, Section 9, clause 4. Read in harmony the Constitution states that direct taxes shall be apportioned among the states but shall not to be done unless in proportion to the enumeration according to the census.
At the present time, the way these taxes are imposed suggests no distinction or certainty between their classifications, i.e. the form and limitations of indirect and direct taxes. The direct tax appeared to be limited by the Constitution as a form of tax imposed upon the states. This in turn appears to have been expressed by the writers as a limitation on the legislative and territorial jurisdiction of our national government.
APPORTIONMENT: To divide according to a proportion or plan; allot.
PROPORTION: The relationship of a part to a whole; ratio; arrange with harmony and balance.
To understand constitutional apportionment all one has to do is notice how Representatives are elected. A minimum of one representative per state is allowed and additional reps are based on the ratio of the population of the several states. The greater the population, the greater the number of reps, currently restricted to a total of 456 in Congress.
Assuming the argument that the 16th Amendment is valid, let's go back to the Revolutionary war. Funding for the War was not extracted from the Citizenry, but rather from the collective states and done so under the Articles of Confederation of 1778. These articles lacked enforcement powers to collect sums from the several states, and the ensuing attempt to rewrite these articles allowing for such tax collection is what led to our current Constitution. With this in mind, it's clear that the intent of Article I, Section 2, clause 3 is that, if there were to be a direct tax, this tax was to be imposed on the States of the Union, apportioned by population, and not to be imposed on the natural persons within the several states. (This is an example of definition by context: "Upon the States." This is "where" the federal tax is so laid: directly upon the States. However, from the people's position it is an indirect tax.)
To help clarify, the question here is how far did the 16th Amendment go in amending the Constitution. I do not believe that the 16th Amendment acted as an express waiver of the limitations of legislative and territorial jurisdiction of our national government. (On its face, the 16th Amendment seems to conflict with Article I, Section 9, clause 4. However, because no attempt was made to eliminate this clause when the 16th Amendment was added, there must be an intent that is deeper than is implied on its face. That intent was clearly aimed at something other than private persons, such as corporate earnings (income) as I will explain.
It appears clear that "apportionment among the several states and without regard to any census or enumeration" relieved the requirement of dividing according to a proportion or plan allotment in relationship to a whole or ratio or to arrange with harmony and balance. It appears that the 16th Amendment did not relieve the national government from collecting taxes so imposed from the States, and was not a grant of power to attack the private person's property.
Let's prove this out: If the 16th Amendment truly removed the above limitation of legislative and territorial jurisdiction, and the federal and state governments were not limited to respective legislative and territorial jurisdiction there was absolutely no need for the 1939 Public Salaries Act. This Act, by reciprocal agreement, allowed each government entity to concurrently tax each other's amounts controlled and paid to government employees as wages and monies that they controlled and paid out. This was without doubt a direct tax on their specific public wage. However, this Act did not extend to non-government employees, nor did the 16th Amendment!
With this in mind Hylton v. U.S. and Pollock v. Farmer's Loan rulings are understandable; both ruling income tax laws as unconstitutional. (Later, of course, the obstacles were overcome, and the Pollock ruling, made previously to the 16th Amendment as mentioned above, actually helped in the passage of the 16th Amendment which then fundamentally reenacted the 1913 Act.)
The history of the enactment and the alleged subsequent ratification of the 16th Amendment discloses beyond doubt that the intent and purpose was to tax income derived from government granted privileges, particularly corporate activities, and profits arising from the sale of commodities and other capital assets.
The 16th Amendment only authorized the taxing of income derived FROM, AND NOT ON, the source.
"The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states and without regard to any census or enumeration."
- 16th Amendment, U.S. Constitution
The United States Supreme Court, in 1895, had found an income tax unconstitutional, and Congress was concerned that the Court would find the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 also unconstitutional. In Pollock supra, the Income Tax Act of 1894 was declared unconstitutional BECAUSE it failed to separate the source of the income from the income itself, which resulted in the unconstitutional taxing of BOTH the source and the income.
The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the intent of the 16th Amendment as:
"... the result intended (was) the prevention of the resort to the sources from which a taxed income was derived, in order to cause a direct tax on the income, to do a direct tax on the source itself, and thereby take an income tax out of the class of excises, duties, and imposts and place it in the class of direct taxes."
-Brushaber v. Union Pacific, 240 U.S. 1(1915)
Brushaber also makes it clear that, since an income tax is without apportionment, the tax cannot be a direct tax because the Constitution (after ratification of the 16th Amendment) still requires that all direct taxes must be apportioned. This acknowledgment evidences my earlier claim that the actual source of taxation is Article I, Section 8, clause 1 and not the 16th Amendment. This Amendment was intended to keep the income tax subject to Article I, Section 8, by keeping it an INDIRECT (excise) tax on income from (not "on") the SOURCE, thereby preventing a direct tax on the source, by separating the source from the income. In the Brushaber case, the Court discussed the Pollock case, stating that the Income Tax Act of 1894 was declared unconstitutional because, to permit it to operate, "... would leave the burden of the (income) tax to be borne by professions, trades, employment's or vacations; and in that way, what was intended as a tax on capital would remain, in substance, a tax on occupations and labor, ... a result which, it was held, could not have been contemplated by the Congress. ... considering the substance of things it was direct on property in a constitutional sense, since to burden the property from which the income was derived and thus accomplished the very thing which the provision as to apportionment of direct taxes was adopted to prevent. .... that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax ... thus destroying the two classifications which have been recognized and enforced from the beginning is wholly without foundation."
With the above statement, the Supreme Court made it perfectly clear that the income tax is not a direct tax -- but an indirect tax. And:
:"It is clear on the face of this text that it does not purport to confer power to levy income taxes in a generic sense ..."
Thus, any theory that an income tax, in a generic sense without apportionment, if acceded too, would cause one provision of the U.S. Constitution to destroy another. This would result in bringing the provisions of the 16th Amendment (exempting a direct tax from apportionment) into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes must be apportioned. Such an argument would clearly be without merit.
Pursuant to Brushaber, the tax in question cannot be a direct tax. Since it is not a direct tax, IT MUST THEN BE AN INDIRECT TAX, THUSLY INVOLVING A PRIVILEGE. Therefore, if a natural person is to be held liable for filing and paying some indirect tax or excise, it must be shown such person has been partaking in some privilege or granted franchise. If such privilege has not been so proven such person or individual cannot be held liable for an indirect income tax or an excise. The Brushaber Court confirmed that the 16th Amendment empowers the Congress to lay and collect an income tax (not a direct tax) subject to the explicit rules and requirements of Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution; i.e., the words "income" tax and "excise" tax are synonymous under the 16th Amendment. It was BECAUSE the 16th Amendment SEPARATED the source from the income, that the Brushaber Court declared the "income tax" to be constitutional. Clearly this Court declared constitutional an indirect (excise) tax on income, without apportionment, leaving the source (wages, salaries, fees, commissions, etc,) free of any such tax. (This is backed up by many such decisions even in our current lowly administrative tax courts. The Tax Court in Penn Mutual v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. (1959), at page 659 conceded, "The source of the taxing power is not the 16th Amendment. It is Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.")
The Brushaber case has never been overruled or overturned, not in whole, or in part. In fact, it is the primary case often used to support a given government position. Further, it is my belief after much research that the 16th Amendment was intended to act as a tax basically upon corporations, leveling the playing field with the private sector, and was widely publicized and eventually ratified as such. It was never intended to, nor approved of, as a direct tax on compensation for labor.
"The 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation, but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged."
Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916)
The Stanton Court went on to explain that as it was repeatedly held, the 16th Amendment "did not extend the taxing power to new subjects." Yes, Congress has always had the power to create an income tax, even before the 16th Amendment. But their jurisdictional limitations do not allow such powers to extend to private and natural rights held by the people, not before the 16th Amendment, and not since.
"The 16th Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the Amendment was adopted."
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205 (1920)
That the 16th Amendment authorizes only an indirect (excise) tax, which is the proper and limited application for indirect liability, was interpreted seventy years ago in a case concluded in a federal court which involved an insurance agent and his compensation in the form of first-time commissions:
"... the statute, and the statute alone, determines what is income to be taxed. It taxes only income derived from many different specified sources; one does not derive income by rendering services and charging for them."
Edwards v. Keith, 231 F.110 (1916)
Wages, salaries, first-time commissions, and loans are SOURCES of investment income (capital), and the 16th Amendment PROHIBITS taxing the SOURCE, without apportionment, since the tax is on income DERIVED FROM THE SOURCE, AND NOT ON THE SOURCE ITSELF. This directly conflicts with the present collection policy of the IRS which is directed towards collecting a DIRECT tax on BOTH the SOURCE and the INCOME, when the 16th Amendment (the law) ONLY allows for an indirect tax on income.
It is well established law that the present "income tax" is an indirect (excise) tax. Brushaber and Stanton state as much. However, the exercise of the unalienable or common law right to labor is not a government granted privilege from whence an excise tax may be exacted. To tax such activities of the working class people merely because they exercise their right to work, protected under the due process clause of the 5th Amendment, was not intended or established under the 16th Amendment. (see "right to work" rulings: Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 1897, 165 U.S.; Butchers' Union Co. v. Cresent City Co., 1884, 111 U.S. 746;Murdock v. Penna., 319 U.S. 105.)
Another important issue here is the "intent" of Congress in passing the 16th Amendment. In the Hylton and Pollock cases, the Supreme Court ruled INCOME and PROPERTY were indistinguishable. Therefore, the income tax was struck down as unconstitutional because it failed to separate the source from the income, which resulted in the unlawful taxation of both, source and income indirectly. The Pollock Court went on to declare the Federal Income Tax Act of 1894 unconstitutional for want of apportionment, because income and property were indistinguishable and an excise tax cannot burden property for want of due process. Regarding this case, Chief Justice Fuller stated:
"Thus, in the matter of taxation, the Constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct and indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be governed, namely: The rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts and excises."
In the rehearing of the Pollock case (158 U.S. 601), argued May 6-8, 1895, decided May 20, 1895, Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the Court and quoted Chief Justice John Marshall citing McCullock v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407, stating:
"In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution that we are expounding."
Pollock id. 617
Further, Justice fuller stated: "The tax imposed by sections twenty-seven to thirty-seven, inclusive, of the Act of 1894, so far as it falls on the income of all estate and of personal property, being a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional and void because not apportioned according to representation, are necessarily invalid."
Pollock id. 637
As late as 1915 the above essence was restated by the then Chief Justice White giving the opinion of the Court in the Brushaber case. In his reference to the Pollock case and the therein discussed direct and indirect taxes and the taxing clauses of Article I of the Constitution, Justice White stated:
"The requirement of the Constitution is that no direct tax shall be laid otherwise than by apportionment."
Pollock id. 557
During this time frame, one could argue that Congress was a bit confused as to their actual taxing powers, and in their reliance on recent Court rulings, they were reacting with less powers of taxation than they actually possessed. This is one of the presumed reasons behind the ruling of the Court in Spreckles Sugar Ref. Co., v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904). Here the Supreme Court affirmed that Congress has the power to tax income arising from the government granted privilege of incorporation. Having suffered defeat in the Pollock case, Congress was apparently unaware it could tax corporate profits, and the Court felt compelled to clear this misconception up. HOWEVER, with this then established, the final outcome was the 16th Amendment, DEALING WITH INCOME AT ITS SOURCE-- CORPORATE EARNINGS, from whatever source derived.
An important source for this (factual) theory is the Congressional Record (Senate) of 1909 including June 16, S-334; June 30, S-3976; July 2, S-4043. During the Senate debates which quickly ensued, the Floor frequently referred to the Spreckles Sugar case AS A STANDARD UPON WHICH TO PATTERN THE 16TH AMENDMENT. Consequent to these hearings, Senate Joint Resolution 40, a corporation excise tax act, House Resolution 1438 (36b Stat. 112), AND THE 16TH AMENDMENT, were all introduced circa late June 1909. Clearly the intent of the 16th Amendment can be found in these hearings -- regarding -CORPORATE PROFITS.
A special session was convened on March 4, 1909, for the purpose of revising the Dingley Tariff Act of 1894, which provided for a direct tax without apportionment, later ruled to be unconstitutional in the Pollock case. Then President Taft, in his message to Congress on June 16, 1909, shortly before the 16th Amendment was introduced, stated:
"... (I)t is now proposed to make up the deficit by the imposition of a general income tax, in form and substance of almost exactly the same character as that which in the case of Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., (157 U.S. 429) was held by the Supreme Court to be a direct tax, and therefore not within the power of the federal government to impose unless apportioned among the several states according to population. The decision in the Pollock case left power in the National Government to levy an excise tax, which accomplished the same purpose as a corporation income tax and is free from certain objections urged to the proposed income tax."
1909 Congressional Record p. 3344
As Senate Joint Resolution No. 39 was being mulled about in the Senate, eventually introduced to the Senate on June 17, 1909, it was submitted to the Senate Finance Committee as follows: "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect direct taxes on incomes without apportionment among the several States according to population." Clearly this would not fly since it was in direct conflict with the ruling in the Pollock case. Eventually it was slightly reworded in order to ensure that its construction was in accordance with the constitutional authorities of an excise tax and it became the 16th Amendment.
In session with this Amendment, Senator Frank Flint of California stated (Congressional Record p. 3936):
"The committee decided that it would be unwise to pass an income tax amendment in form and substance like those introduced by the Senator from Texas, Mr. Bailey and the Senator from Iowa, Mr. Cummins. We felt that, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Pollock case, it would be indelicate, at least, for the Congress of the United States to pass another measure and ask the Supreme Court to pass upon it, when they had already passed upon the proposition in that case."
(a senatorial response)
"I know that those who will attempt to defend the validity of this tax will say that it is an income tax, and will say that it is not a property tax. But when they say that, they declare that it is a tax upon the franchises of the corporations created by the several states of the Union -- a tax upon their right to do business as corporations. It is not a tax upon the privilege of carrying on the dry goods business; not a tax upon the privilege of carrying on the beef-packing business; but a tax upon the right to do business of any kind as a corporation. And I should like to ask the Senator from California whether I have expressed the real construction and interpretation of the amendment as he views it?"
(Mr. Flint.) I may state to the Senator what I said last night when I was asked for my construction of this amendment, and that was that it is an excise tax upon the privilege of doing business. It is true that this amendment limits the taxes to certain corporations, and that we have the power to do this is sustained by several cases which the Senator himself has quoted. In one case they selected insurance companies and taxed them; in the Spreckles case they selected two different classes -- sugar refineries and oil refineries. In this amendment we have made a classification which includes certain corporations and all insurance companies."
(Congressional Record, p. 3976, June 30, 1909
There is nothing that can be found in the record of the Sixty-first Congress which even insinuates that private individuals who are not represented through incorporation, have no capitol stock represented by shares, are not organized for profit and not paying such dividends, are to be the subject of the income tax laws. There is a preponderance of evidence that the 16th Amendment was aimed at, and only aimed at, profits generated by a privileged activity, an activity which was created by government such as corporate business.
In the special session of Congress in 1909, Senator Norris Brown of Nebraska introduced Senate Joint Resolution No. 39 (Congressional Record, p. 3377), for "direct taxes on incomes without apportionment among the several States according to population." This Senate resolution came out of the Senate Finance Committee (No. 40) as an excise tax. This transformation clears the air of any doubt that the lawmakers were attempting to pass a bill that the Supreme Court would not declare unconstitutional. In addition this is further supported by the fact that Tariff Act 1438 was introduced on June 28-29, 1909 at almost the same time as S.J. 40.
The express purpose of the 16th Amendment was to avert, once and for all, the issue presented in Pollock, i.e., under the 16th Amendment, income and property (capital) are not synonymous. What else could we construe from all of this "feverish" congressional activity during this time span? Congress can tax property by rule of apportionment. This power they have always possessed. But to this day, they have yet to choose to do so. Instead, they labored heavily on defeating the defects in previous corporate tax bills to perfect the same -- a corporate tax amendment -- the 16th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
If corporate profits were not the aim of the 16th Amendment, what is the sense behind USC Title 26, Section 6331 with no similar statute identifying private persons. A first year law student can tell you "IF IT'S NOT THE LAW, IT'S NOT THE LAW." The problem is that even by the time they graduate, they still have no idea what due process actually means, proved by our courts current calendars and rulings.
Internal Revenue Code, Section 6331. Levy and Distraint.
(a)AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY.-- If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax. Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer, employee, or elected official, of the United States or the District of Columbia, by serving a notice of levy on the employer.
I appeal to you, Sir, to engage the Congressional Research Service to rebut my above findings and conclusions and to render unto you and me the Internal Revenue Code and its corresponding Code of Federal Regulation that requires all persons employed for compensation to be made to pay a portion of thier property to the government of the United States.
Respectfully Submitted, 27 July, 1994
Bruce A. Hedrick
WEBSTER'S 1828; definitions-
PRESS, n. (Liberty of the press) in civil policy, is the free right of publishing books, pamphlets or papers without previous restraint; or the unrestrained right which every citizen enjoys of publishing his thoughts and opinions, subject only to punishment for publishing what is pernicious to morals or to the peace of the state.